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ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 422 F.Supp. 1280 (D. Del. 1976).
The receiver for a dissolved Delaware corporation (D'Angelo) brought
an action against a decentralized agency of the Mexican government
(Pemex) for an accounting of the corporation's royalty and participating
interests in oil expropriated by the Mexican government. Pemex moved
for summary judgment.
In 1938, Mexico expropriated the "personal and real properties" of
seventeen foreign oil companies. Subsequently, the Mexican President
issued a decree delegating to Pemex the responsibility for determining
those parties entitled to compensation. Following a request by Pemex,
the Mexican attorney-general rendered an official opinion that the decree
of expropriation extinguished all of the rights of the royalty holders.
Although the receiver admitted the validity of the decree of expro-
priation, he contended the decree did not encompass the corporation's
interests since it only owned royalty and participating interests attribut-
able to the oil concessions. The receiver further claimed that the Act of
State doctrine did not foreclose examination of a claim against a purely
commercial enterprise such as Pemex. Finally, the receiver contended
that, even if the corporation's interests were in fact extinguished by the
decree of expropriation, Pemex was obligated by Mexican law to com-
pensate the corporation for the value of its interests. Pemex claimed that
the failure to recognize and pay most of the plaintiffs claims was an act
of state of the Mexican government which precluded the U.S. court from
looking into the validity of the claims. An opinion of the attorney general
of Mexico was introduced to support the validity of the President of
Mexico's actions in authorizing Pemex to settle claims for compensation.
The court, citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), ac-
cepted the opinion of the attorney general of Mexico as an official decla.
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ration by the Mexican government that the expropriation decree extin-
guished the corporation's royalty and participating rights. As such, the
decree constituted an act of state precluding further inquiry into its scope
and effect. Observing that Pemex was not in existence when the expropri-
ation occurred, the court held that the fact that the Mexican government
ultimately entered the oil business through Pemex did not make the ex-
propriation itself a commercial activity. The court also considered the
Mexican attorney general's opinion as controlling on the failure to com-
pensate the corporation. The actions of Permex in denying compensation
were sovereign governmental acts entitled to Act of State protection. The
court pointed out that conduct not evidenced by a formal decree did not
lose its character as an act of state if there was sufficient evidence in the
record of such an act. See Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U'S. 682




Frank B. Hall & Co. v. S.S. Sealreeze Atlantic, 423 F.Supp. 1205 (S.D.
N.Y. 1976).
This case involved an action brought by plaintiff Hall, an insurance
broker, against the defendants, owners of the ship Seafreeze Atlantic, to
recover amounts advanced by Hall on their behalf to procure insurance
for the ship "until time of sailing."
The Seafreeze Atlantic was a ship built under an experimental pro.
gram in 1969. After two years it was found to be commercially in-
operable, and was therefore docked and decommissioned in April of 1971.
At no time after that date did the ship leave the dock, at least for any
commercial voyages. In April of 1974 the defendants purchased the Sea-
freeze Atlantic, in hopes of restoring her to commercial operation, and
retained Hall as an insurance broker to effect a policy of insurance upon
its hull and machinery. In February of 1975, after the defendants failed
to make their premium payments, Hall personally advanced the amount
due to avoid cancellation of the policy. The defendants denied any obliga-
tion to repay, and Hall brought suit in the Federal Court, alleging ad-
miralty jurisdiction, to recover the amounts advanced.
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The district court never reached the merits of Hall's contentions, hut
rather granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The
court's decision that admiralty jurisdiction was lacking was based upon
two grounds.
First, the court followed the observation advanced by Professor
Moore that insurance policies on "mothballed" vessels (those withdrawn
from navigation for an indefinite period of time) and the premium on
those policies, fall beyond the jurisdiction of admiralty. 7 A Moore's
Federal Practice § 255(l), at 3024, (2d ed. 1976). This observation is in
accord with the general rule that admiralty is limited to vessels actually
in navigation, or only temporarily withdrawn from the state of commer-
cial grace. In determining that the Seafreeze Atlantic was "mothballed,"
and therefore the insurance premiums related to policies on it were beyond
the jurisdiction of admiralty, the court relied heavily upon the fact that
the ship had been lying idle for over four years, and that there was no
prospect at the time of the vessel's return to commerce or navigation.
Second, the court agreed with Judge Wallace, dissenting in Stanley
T. Scott & Co. v. Makah Development Corp., 490 F.2d 525 (9th Cir.
1974), that the implied-in-law contractual rights to reimbursement for
premiums advanced to maintain marine insurance policies were not mari-
time in nature and therefore do not give rise to admiralty jurisdiction.
Courts have consistently held that a contract to procure marine insurance
is not within admiralty jurisdiction, and that to grant admiralty jurisdic-
tion in cases such as this would needlessly expand federal jurisdiction.
This case can be viewed as a reluctancy to expand admiralty jurisdic-
tion. If granted, admiralty jurisdiction has important practical conse-
quences to the litigants: the federal courts have jurisdiction; there is no
trial by jury; and special remedies exist for attachment of the defendants'
assets prior to judgment.
John Hogan
ARBITRATION
Fuller Co. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 421 F.Supp. 938
(W.D. Pa. 1976).
Fuller Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, entered into a contract
with Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee (CBG), a Delaware corporation,
LAWYER OF THE AmEwICAS
to sell equipment to be used in a CBG bauxite plant in the Republic of
Guinea. A subsequent meeting on January 28, 1975 led to a dispute
between the parties. Fuller alleged that the meeting was called to settle all
outstanding differences. CBG alleged that it only concerned differences
over the drafts of provisional acceptance certificates which Fuller had
refused to sign.
CBG submitted a request for arbitration to the Court of Arbitration
of the International Chamber of Commerce pursuant to an arbitration
clause in its contract with Fuller, seeking indemnification for costs re-
lated to alleged defects in equipment bought from Fuller. Fuller then filed
a petition for declaratory judgment in the Court of Common Pleas of Alle-
gheny County, seeking determination of the binding effect of the January
"settlement." CBG removed the case to the U.S. District Court, Western
District of Pennsylvania.
The original agreement contained an arbitration clause which pro.
vided that the parties would go to arbitration according to the Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce
"should any dispute arise from interpretation or performance of the con.
tract."
The first issue hefore the court was whether CBG could properly in-
voke the jurisdiction of the federal court pursuant to the terms of the Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
9 U.S.C. §§201-9. Before a federal court can invoke jurisdiction pursuant
to the terms of the Convention, certain conditions must be met. Contracts
between citizens of the United States must either involve property located
abroad, envisage performance or enforcement abroad, or have some other
reasonable relations with one or more foreign states. The court found that
the contract envisaged that Fuller personnel would provide extensive
overseas services, and therefore sustained jurisdiction under the Con-
vention.
The second issue before the court was whether the court should order
arbitration to be convened pursuant to the terms of the Convention. This
issue involved a determination of the scope of the arbitration provision.
The court stated, after determining that Pennsylvania law should apply to
the contract, that there is a strong judicial presumption in favor of arbi-
tration. In order for an arbitration agreement to terminate under Pennsyl-
vania law, the parties must enter into a new contract. The court then
stated that when a settlement agreement was only one of four possible
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inferences arising from the conduct of the parties at the January meeting,
the arbitration clause should be upheld. The court ordered that arbitra-
tion be convened and the trial stayed pending issuance of a final award
in the arbitration.
Barry 1. Harkaway
NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT
United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
Five American defendants were convicted in the Federal District
Court for the Western District of Texas of conspiracy to violate and
violation of the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA). The convictions
arose out of transactions involving certain pre-Columbian artifacts alleged-
ly exported from Mexico in contravention of that country's law. The issue
on appeal was whether the artifacts were in fact "stolen" within the
meaning of the National Stolen Property Act.
The defendants on appeal contended that the artifacts could not be
considered "stolen" within the interpretation of the NSPA. In support of
this position, appellants argued that the term "stolen" covers only acts
which result in the wrongful deprivation of rights of ownership. Since
there was insufficient evidence to support the claim of ownership by the
Republic of Mexico, the illegal exportation of the artifacts could not be
considered a theft within the meaning of the Act.
The Court extensively discussed the development of the laws of
Mexico concerning the preservation and regulation of pre-Columbian arti-
facts. Although Mexico had sought to regulate private ownership of antiq-
uities since 1897, the Court found that it was not until the Federal Law
on Archaeological, Artistic and Historic Monuments and Zones of May 6,
1972 that a declaration of ownership had been made 'by the Mexican
Government which covered all archaeological objects within its jurisdic-
tion.
The Court felt that in order to determine whether any of the pre.
Columbian artifacts were "stolen" it was vital to ascertain the exact date
that the artifacts were exported from Mexico. The Court reasoned that if
the exportation took place after the effective date of the 1972 law, the
artifacts were owned by the Mexican Government and, therefore, illegal
exportation would subject the receiver of the articles to the strictures of
the National Stolen Property Act. If, however, it could be shown that the
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exportation occurred before the 1972 Act, then the jury should have been
instructed to apply only the appropriate Mexican law.
The U.S. Government argued that notwithstanding the error in in-
structing the jury as to the exact date of the declaration of ownership by
the Mexican Government, the evidence was clear that the artifacts were in
the United States after the effective date of the 1972 law. This fact, it was
argued, compelled the inference of recent exportation and hence justified
the application of the National Stolen Property Act. The court rejected
this argument on the ground that "the jury is the only body that could
properly make the inference of recent exportation and a holding by us to
the contrary would, by supplanting our determination for the jury's
verdict, deprive the defendants of their right to a jury trial." [citing
United States v. Casale Car Leasing, Inc., 385 F.2d 707, 712 (2d Cir.
1967)].
The case was reversed and remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Maria Lorts
SEARCH OF VESSEL OUTSIDE TERRITORIAL WATERS
United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976).
The Government appealed the district court's orders granting de-
fendants' motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search of
their vessel and the entry of a judgment of non-forfeiture. Defendants, on
the O/S National, a foreign vessel, were arrested after customs officials
boarded and searched their boat, finding marijuana in the hold. Defend.
ants were charged with violation of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act of 1970 which provides that is is unlawful for any
person to bring or possess a controlled substance on board any vessel
arriving in or departing from the United States or its customs territory.
The facts show that a deputy sheriff became suspicious when he
noticed marijuana debris in and near a truck at the end of the pier. Of
the five vessels which had departed from the harbor that morning, the
less well known vessel was the O/S National. Pursuant to the deputy's re-
quest for apprehension of the vessel, Coast Guard and Customs officials
boarded and conducted a search of the outbound O/S National in customs
waters nine miles from the coast. Defendants were arrested and the O/S
National seized, after marijuana was found on board.
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The district court determined that the search could not be sustained
as a customs search pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a). The court found
that there was insufficient probable cause to support a warrantless search,
and insufficient evidence to sustain the action as a border search. The
Court of Appeals upheld the finding of no probable cause since there was
no connection established between the vessel and the site of the marijuana
transfer. However, the appellate court held the search proper as a "border
search," announcing that a "search in customs waters is a functional
border search when the vessel has crossed from territorial waters of the
United States and there is . . . a reasonable certainty that any contraband
which might be found at the time of the search was also aboard at the
border crossing." Id. at 667. The court reversed the orders granting the
motion to suppress and the judgment of non-forfeiture, and remanded
the case for further proceedings.
In light of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the holding in Stanley establishes an extension of
the border search exception to the requirement of probable cause. Since
a border was clearly crossed, the border search may take place not only at
the border itself (three mile water limit), but at its functional equivalent
as well. However, in Stanley, the border crossing was in the context of
leaving territorial waters of the United States.
The result in Stanley is significant since the constitutionality of the
search is premised on the border search exception in the context of an out-
going border crossing. The decision is grounded upon the Congressional
intent of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970 to protect Americans from the gorwing problem of drug abuse
through the regulation of exportation by Customs officials in order to con-
trol drug trafficking. Further justification for the court's holding is found
by purporting to compare the purposes for the two types of border cross-
ings, incoming and outgoing. In assence, however, the court merely states
the traditional reasons for justifying an incoming border search and sum-
marily concludes that the reasons are sufficiently similar to justify the
constitutionality of the search of an outgoing vessel. The pressures of
official expediency and the context of the outgoing border crossing search
simply do not present circumstances sufficiently compelling to justify a
new exception being carved out of the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
Mary E. Fabre
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STATE TAXATION: GoODs LOADED FOR EXPORT
Fred McGilvray, Inc. v. Reuben O'D. Askew, 340 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1976).
Plaintiff brought suit to contest the assessment of Florida use and
sales taxes pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. The accrued taxes,
assessed at $6,848.95, were levied on personal property which petitioner
maintained was an export and thus exempted from state taxation by the
Import-Export clause of the U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
Petitioner was a subcontractor for a construction project in the
Bahamas. He supplied, fabricated or installed air conditioning and plumb-
ing equipment for the contractor. The disputed tax arose from equipment
ordered from both within and outside the state, which was delivered to
either the petitioner or the contractor in care of Transworld Marine in
Miami. The equipment was stored in Miami and later loaded onto barges
chartered by the contractor for shipment to the Bahamas. No ocean bills
of lading or export declarations with regard to this equipment were before
the Court. The barges transporting the equipment were not instrumentali-
ties of a common carrier.
There being no material issue of fact, the trial judge below entered a
summary judgment against petitioner sustaining the application of the
tax. The only question for consideration on appeal was whether the
equipment was an "export" for the purposes of the Import-Export Clause
of the Constitution. The Court cited Chapter 212.06(5), Florida Statutes,
which provides three tests for determining export status. The statute re-
quires that the property be delivered to a common carrier for shipment
outside the state or to a licensed exporter for exporting or mailed by
United States mail outside of the state. Petitioner did not assert that any
of these tests were satisfied. Therefore, be failed to rebut the statutory
presumption that tangible personal property is not an "export."
Furthermore, the Court found that the instant case was controlled by
Kosydan v. National Cash Register, 417 U.S. 62 (1974). In that case the
Supreme Court upheld the imposition, by Ohio, of a state ad valorem tax
on machines bound for foreign markets but stored in Ohio. The machines
were completely unsuitable for domestic use, thus there was no danger of
them being diverted into the American market. Nevertheless, the Court
found that the entry into the stream of exportation had not been affected
and therefore the state tax was invalid.
The result of Kosydan was the rather mechanistic rule that property
has to be virtually in possession of a common carrier before Constitu-
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tional protection arises. Petitioner's case failed to meet this standard in
light of the uncontested fact that the barges used to transport the equip-
ment were not under the control of a common carrier. The summary
judgment in favor of the State of Florida was affirmed.
John Mauro
